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ABSTRACT
In psychoanalysis, a ‘sublime object’ is one that signifies the transformation of a 
condition of impossibility into one of possibility. On the one hand, it represents a 
moment of internalized prohibition that transforms an impossibility into some-
thing possible: the sublime object turns the impossible sexual object, for example, 
into something that is prohibited, and therefore possible. On the other hand, a 
sublime object represents the objectification of a lack. Or, in other words, it is lack 
in object form; it is the objective correlative of nothingness itself. What better 
definition might we have for the role played by debt in capital, particularly in its 
financial stage?
Debt is the sublimated object of capital in the sense that it is, itself, a pure noth-
ing that attains object form. It is in its object form that this pure nothing makes 
possible the global expansion of capital and the class interests that pertain to the 
latter. Debt operates similarly to the Lacanian the sublime object as the ‘object-
cause of desire’. If we subtract this object from capitalist system we lose the system 
itself. Debt is in this sense the object that, on the other side of its ‘normal’, everyday 
operation contains both a nugget of the truth of the system itself and the mecha-
nism by which the capitalist system may be overthrown. Debt is the lack in the 
capitalist system that overlaps with the lack that is the exploited subject.
In my paper, I use the Lacanian concept of the sublime object to demonstrate 
how debt represents the sublimated object of capital; and, as such, it is the central, 
universal cause that has the potential to open up a space for the interpellation of 
radical revolutionary subjectivity.
RÉSUMÉ
En psychanalyse, une «objet sublime» est une qui indique la transformation d’une 
condition d’impossibilité dans une de possibilité. D’une part, il représente un 
moment d’interdiction intériorisée qui se transforme en une impossibilité quelque 
chose de possible: l’objet sublime devient l’objet sexuel impossible, par exemple, 
dans quelque chose qui est interdit, et donc possible. D’autre part, un objet sublime 
représente l’objectivation d’un manque. Ou, en d’autres termes, c’est le manque 
sous forme d’objet, il est le corrélatif objectif du néant lui-même. Quelle meilleure 
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définition pourrait que nous avons pour le rôle joué par la dette en capital, en par-
ticulier dans sa phase financière?
La dette est l’objet sublimé du capital dans la mesure où il est lui-même un pur 
néant qui atteint sous forme d’objet. Il est dans sa forme d’objet que ce pur néant 
rend possible l’expansion mondiale du capital et des intérêts de classe qui se rap-
portent à ce dernier. Dette fonctionne de façon similaire à l’objet sublime de Lacan, 
comme «l’objet-cause du désir». Si l›on soustrait cet objet à partir du système capi-
taliste nous perdons le système lui-même. La dette est en ce sens que l›objet, de 
l›autre côté de la «normale», l›exploitation quotidienne contient à la fois une pépite 
de la vérité du système lui-même et le mécanisme par lequel le système capitaliste 
peut être renversé. La dette est le manque dans le système capitaliste qui chevauche 
le manque qui fait l›objet exploité.
Cet article utilise le concept Lacanien de l›objet sublime de démontrer comment 
la dette représente l›objet sublimé du capital, et, comme tel, il est le centre, cause 
universelle qui a le potentiel d›ouvrir un espace pour l›interpellation du radical 
subjectivité révolutionnaire.
KEYWORDS: debt; finance; securitization; sublime object; sublimation
¤
Introduction2
In recent years, debt has become a prominent object of inquiry for critical and 
cultural theorists. Although debt is not a new category of investigation for criti-
cal political economists, books such as David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 Years 
(2011) and Richard Dienst’s The Bonds of Debt: Borrowing Against the Common Good 
(2011), along with the formation of the Strike Debt movement, have illuminated 
the politics of debt in the context of the most recent financial crisis (2007–08) and 
its place in mainstream discourse.3 Debt has been at stake in some of the most 
explosive political struggles in Europe and North America over the past few years: 
The debt that the Greeks, Irish, Portuguese, English, and Icelanders do not 
want to repay and against which they have been protesting over the last 
several [years]; the debt that legitimizes the increase in British university 
tuition and has provoked violent clashes in London; the debt that justifies 
cutting off 800 euros per family in the UK in order to reestablish [sic] a bal-
anced budget in the aftermath of the financial crisis; the debt that calls for 
budget cuts to education in Italy and which Roman students have risen up 
to oppose; the debt that cuts social services, financing of the arts, unemploy-
ment and basic welfare benefits… .” (Lazzarato 2012: 24–5
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Debt has been used as the justification for the removal of collective bargaining 
rights from workers in Canada, including postal workers, Air Canada employees, 
and public school teachers in Ontario; and it was used to justify a proposed rise in 
post-secondary tuition fees in Quebec, which sparked a massive student and public 
uprising in the summer of 2012.4
In both the developed and developing worlds, debt has been the single most effec-
tive means of disciplining labour since the development of neoliberalism in the 
1970s, whether through structural adjustment programs, or it’s first-world equiva-
lent: austerity.5 Debt is of interest because it plays a structural role in the circula-
tion of capital; expansion and growth, from at least the beginning of this period, 
would not have been possible without what I will refer to here as the “sublimation 
of debt.” 
Cultural theory might play a role in articulating the logic of debt in finance capi-
tal differently, in a way that can help to subjectivize debt as an object of political 
thought. My present interests lie with the Lacanian “sublime object,” a concept 
that represents a moment of internalized prohibition that cognitively transforms 
impossibility into something possible. Prohibition makes the sublime object appear 
as though it has a positive existence in reality, to which access is barred by the pro-
hibition. For example, in his Seminar XX: Encore, Lacan claims that sublimation in 
courtly love makes up for the absence of the sexual relationship “by feigning that we 
are the ones who erect an obstacle thereto,” when really there is no sexual relation 
(Lacan 1998: 69). Prohibition obscures the non-existence of the object and hence 
the impossibility of its attainment. A sublime object represents the objectification 
of this lack/impossibility. It is lack in object form: the objective correlative of noth-
ingness itself. What better definition might we have for the role of debt in capital, 
particularly in its financial stage?
Debt is the sublimated object of capital in the sense that it is a pure nothing that 
attains object form as fictitious capital, such as credit and other financial commodi-
ties, including mortgage backed securities. In its object form, this pure nothing 
makes possible the global expansion of capital and capitalist class interests. Debt 
operates similarly to the Lacanian sublime object, as the “object-cause of desire” 
(the objet petit a). Since debt is the objectification of lack, if we subtract debt-as-
object from the capitalist system, we lose the system itself. Debt is in this sense the 
object that in its “normal,” everyday operation contains both a nugget of the system’s 
truth (the gap/lack at its core), and the mechanism of its structural transforma-
tion and potential dissolution; the redistribution of debt necessarily redistributes 
wealth. Debt is the lack in the capitalist system that overlaps with the lack that is 
the exploited subject.6
What I propose in this paper is that the role of debt in the objective system of capi-
talist production is analogous to the role of the “sublime object” in the constitution 
of the subject’s libidinal economy. However, because debt pertains to subjection and 
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expansion, which are both necessary elements in maintaining the capitalist order, it 
is also the key to imagining emancipation from capitalist exploitation, not unlike 
the way that Slavoj Žižek relates political emancipation to the sublime object and 
enjoyment. Like the sublime object, debt is split between desire and drive.
I begin with an explanation of the sublime object as it has been taken up in Lacan-
ian psychoanalysis, and particularly in Žižek’s theory of subjectivity and ideology. 
Then I move on to an explanation of the form that debt takes when sublimated in 
the logic of finance capital. Here, I examine the way that debt operates in financial 
commodities, such as securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and credit 
default swaps (CDSs). Debt is then analyzed in the overall context of capitalist 
expansion and growth. In conclusion, I take up the role of debt as the sublime object 
of ideology, and as the “object-cause” capable of interpellating an emancipatory 
subject position. In order to understand the latter, it is necessary to grasp the way 
that the sublime object divides the subject in its relation to enjoyment, to which I 
now turn.
The Sublime Object, or the Affective Dimension of Lack and Surplus
The sublime object pertains to arousal. But arousal need not occur strictly in the 
context of sexuality. Sublimation, for Freud, has to do with the diversion of sexual 
desire into non-sexual areas of human life. The sublime accounts for “human activi-
ties which have no apparent connection with sexuality, but which are assumed to be 
motivated by the force of the sexual instinct” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 431). 
Art, for example, redirects the sexual instinct towards aesthetic creativity and the 
pleasure it provides. But Lacan defined the sublime simply as the raising of the 
object—the sublime object—to the dignity of the Thing (Lacan 1992: 112). The 
latter invokes the overlap between the psychoanalytic conception of the sublime 
and the Kantian sublime.
The Kantian sublime describes a gap in our experience of empirical objects in phe-
nomenal reality. This is a gap that separates phenomena from noumena: the Thing-
in-itself, which lies beyond representation. According to Kant, no representation 
can adequately come close to the dimensions of the Thing. We can know only our 
knowledge of things, but we cannot know things-in-themselves. The sublime signals 
two aspects of experiencing the Thing, both in its negative and positive forms: it 
represents our coming close to the Thing, but it also signals our failure to ever grasp 
an understanding of the Thing, which is why the sublime object procures both 
pleasure and pain—the Lacanian definition of jouissance. The sublime object gives 
us pleasure in coming close to the Thing, but also represents a painful experience 
of our lack of access to the Thing beyond representation. 
While for Kant the Thing exists beyond all phenomenal reality, for Hegel the sub-
lime merely signals the fact that there is nothing beyond phenomenal reality. The 
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form of our experience of the sublime does not change as we still experience the 
sublime in terms of both pleasure and pain. For Hegel, the sublime does not signal 
the transcendental beyond of the Thing, but the immanence of the negative—nega-
tivity as a positive feature of the Thing. The Kantian sublime therefore relates to 
the desire aroused in coming close to the transcendental object while the Hegelian 
sublime announces the lack in the structure of our experience of the transcendental. 
This lack announces the positive condition of the subject as one of negativity or, in 
other words, as lack(ing). 
Reinterpreting Lacan through the prism of Kant and Hegel, Žižek argues that 
there is an overlap between the Thing and the subject. The Thing is ultimately the 
subject itself (Žižek 1999: 305). The subject represents the immanent negativity of 
the structure of symbolic reality—it overlaps with the gap in the structure. This is 
why the basic problem for the subject of psychoanalysis is not whether reality “out 
there” exists; rather, the problem for the subject is the traumatic encounter with 
the possibility of her own non-existence (Žižek 2005: 57). It is here that we can 
begin to understand the Lacanian thesis on the sublime object, which is raised to 
the dignity of the Thing. The sublime object “fills out the void, the impossibility of 
the signifying representation of the subject” (Žižek 1989: 208). The sublime object 
is the objectification of a lack that is the subject. It is that which stands in for the 
missing representation of the subject in the symbolic field of the Other, which gives 
a minimum of consistency to the subject’s positive sense of self. However, in order 
for the subject to emerge in the field of symbolic “reality,” she is forced to renounce 
this traumatic lack, which she is paradoxically condemned to seek out as part of 
the constitution of her own positive existence. It is in this way that the subject 
emerges into the symbolic order as a desiring subject. The sublime object stands for 
the “object-cause of desire,” or the lost object of which the subject is constantly in 
pursuit. Its positive existence is its condition of being lost, and so it acts as a lure 
that propels the subject’s ongoing attempt to attain the impossible object of desire. 
Blind to the fact that the sublime object is only a lure—that it in fact has no positive 
existence—, the subject conceives the scenario of her desire through fantasy. Fantasy 
is not the scenario of attaining the lost object of desire; it is, rather, the scenario that 
teaches the subject about what she desires. 
While desire involves the constant pursuit of the lost object, drive represents the 
kind of enjoyment that is procured by this pursuit. In constantly failing to attain 
the object of desire, drive emerges as an odd enjoyment that the subject receives 
from continuing to fail. Drive turns failure into success and emerges as surplus 
enjoyment (surplus jouissance). Sublimation stands for the transformation of the 
impossibility of enjoyment into the successful enjoyment of failure, while fantasy 
works as a screen that prevents the subject from realizing that she is obtaining lit-
tle nuggets of enjoyment by failing to get the lost object. The sublime, therefore, 
raises the object to the dignity of the Thing through this weird mix of pleasure and 
pain, which reaffirms as it denies the immanent negativity of the subject herself. 
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She is the very loss that the lost object may fill out in the symbolic order; but her 
pursuit of the lost object produces both the lack and the surplus of the object, not 
as desire, but as drive. 
The sublime object plays the role of mediating between the lost object of desire, 
and loss itself as an object in drive. At a very basic level, the object deals with the 
transubstantiation of lack into surplus. The logic of the sublime object can help us 
to explain some of the structural contradictions of capitalism, locate the capitalist 
enjoyment of failure, and find how capital turns failure into success. It is here that 
we can start to understand debt as the sublimated object of capital.7
Sublimating Debt: Securities, CDOs, and CDSs
The clearest example of sublimated debt in the logic of capital is that of debt 
securitization. Securities turn debt into tradable commodities on the market. The 
process takes sums of debt from sources such as mortgages, corporate loans, credit 
card debt, student loans, etc., and repackages them as securities that can be pur-
chased (McNally 2011: 99). Securities assure the buyer a steady stream of income 
through the interest payments due on debts, and directly demonstrate the way in 
which debt, as a lack in the system, is sublimated in the production of surplus-value. 
According to David McNally, securitization fundamentally changes the role of 
banks. Instead of making money by lending at a higher rate than the one at which 
that money was borrowed, banks now provide loans and then sell them off to 
institutions that create financial products like mortgage-backed securities. Banks 
can move loans from their ledgers and accumulate a fee every time they sell them 
to investment banks. The risk is therefore passed on to its new owner. Much of 
the profit generated by banks comes from selling of these new financial products, 
instead of from interest on individual loans, which creates incentives for banks to 
increase the number of loans they offer. This is what lead banks in the United States 
to offer low-wage workers, especially African-Americans, mortgages at subprime 
rates. These mortgages were offered to increase the profit that could be earned 
through debt securitization, which worked out well until interest rates went up and 
the poor were unable to pay back their loans. Although securities can bring high 
returns for capital, they are risky.
The financial sector introduced credit-default swaps (CDS) to reduce risk and 
further push the profit-generating machine. A CDS is like an insurance policy 
where, for a high price, a financial institution will agree to “swap” the default risk 
of a security. Buying up risk is like making a bet that the possibility of default is 
low. The higher the risk, the higher the cost for a CDS. For a long time, risk was 
deemed low and insurance companies such as AIG sold CDSs to anyone who was 
interested. In 2000 it became legal to buy CDSs on assets not owned by the inves-
tor (McNally 2011: 105).
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Derivatives are another form of financial risk management. Derivatives “are meant 
to provide protection from financial and currency volatility” (McNally 2011: 94). 
They are contracts in which no actual commodity is exchanged in the here and 
now, but the price of the commodity to be exchanged in the future is derived from 
the prices of real commodities in the present. Derivatives therefore reduce risk by 
locking in a price prior to the actual sale of the commodity. However, when deriva-
tives are implicated in exchanges of financial commodities such as collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), the price is most often set by expectations of future values 
rather than past exchanges. These future values have become rather unpredictable. 
McNally notes that, since 1973, there has been a significant increase in transactions 
involving financial derivatives related to currency and financial uncertainty.
What the examples of debt securities, CDOs and CDSs demonstrate is that, far 
from being just a “cog in the machine,” debt has become the very condition of 
possibility for capitalist expansion. Its limit, in other words, is its very condition of 
possibility. As Maurizio Lazzarato puts it, “[d]ebt is not an impediment to growth. 
Indeed, it represents the economic and subjective engine of the modern-day econ-
omy. Debt creation… has been conceived and programmed as the strategic heart of 
neoliberal politics” (Lazzarato 2012: 25). Nevertheless, the financial stage of capi-
talism shouldn’t be seen as merely an aberration from the “real” economy. Rather, 
finance—what Lazzarato refers to as the “debt economy” of finance viewed from the 
subjective position of the debtor (24)—must be placed within the overall structure 
and cycle of capitalist accumulation.
Surplus-Value, Competition, Expansion, Debt
According to David Harvey, in the 1980s, the amount of debt held by the average 
household was around $40,000. This has risen to about $130,000 (Harvey 2010: 
17). Household debt has been on the rise, promoted by financial institutions, which 
were needed in order to support continued demand as the wages of working peo-
ple stopped increasing. In the 1980s, the extension of credit began with workers 
who were steadily employed. According to Harvey, the market became exhausted 
by the 1990s and credit had to be extended to those with lower incomes. Political 
pressure was put on financial institutions to loosen credit, then, awash with credit, 
these institutions debt-financed those without steady incomes. Harvey notes that 
without this extension of financing, “who would have bought all the new houses 
and condominiums the debt-financed property developers were building?” (Harvey 
2010: 17). Financial institutions were debt-financing both developers and buyers, 
and thus controlled supply and demand. This has also been the case with various 
forms of consumer credit, extended for the purchase of luxury commodities, and 
for more basic daily needs as real wages have decreased.
If we are to understand the structural role of debt in finance-led capital, it is neces-
sary to put it into the context of the general story of capitalist expansion and crisis. 
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As Karl Marx (1990) explains in Capital, the place to begin is by thinking about 
what capitalists actually do when they start the cycle of accumulation. The capitalist 
begins with some money (M) and uses a portion of that money to buy up materials, 
machinery, and labour power (C), which are all put to work in order to produce 
a commodity that can then be sold in the market for a value that is greater than 
the original amount put into production. This creates profit, or surplus value (M1). 
The general formula for the production of surplus value developed in the first part 
of Capital Volume One is therefore: M-C-M1. While it appears that surplus value 
originates in the laws of supply and demand in the market (buying low and selling 
high), Marx shows that it actually comes from the exploitation of surplus labour 
time in the production process. The labour power sold by the worker is used by the 
capitalist for the time necessary to produce a value greater than the price of this 
labour. The production of surplus value originates in the exploitation of labour by 
capital: profit is first produced by extracting more work than was actually bargained 
for from the labourer. Commodity fetishism obscures this fact for both the labourer 
and the capitalist, where the price or exchange value of a commodity appears to 
directly represent value but ultimately accounts for an original lack or gap produced 
in the labourer to generate profit. Proletarianization names this process of produc-
ing a “substanceless subjectivity,” where unpaid surplus labour time is extracted and 
appropriated from the worker. 
Surplus value is produced in the production process and realized in the market; 
but, as every capitalist knows, if he does not re-invest some of that surplus value in 
expanded production, he will fail in competition with other capitalists. Competition 
between capitalists creates a barrier to further accumulation since “other capital-
ists have an interest in taking markets and sales from their competitors” (McNally 
2011: 74). As capitalists compete with each other for the sale of products to a finite 
number of consumers, they enter into a conflict for dominance of the market. 
A second barrier to accumulation comes from labour. The human body is limited 
by the need to eat, sleep and reproduce, taking time away from the production pro-
cess. An additional barrier is organized labour and class struggle, with its power to 
demand higher wages, fewer working hours and better working conditions. Thus, 
the barriers of competition and labour “impose an imperative on each and every 
capitalist to invest in new technologies that break through workers’ resistance, speed 
up work, and get an edge on the competition” (McNally 2011: 74). Through com-
petition, capitalists are compelled to act in this way. They are bound to continue 
investing part of their surplus value into production efficiencies in order to lower 
costs and boost sales, increasing profits over their competitors. The goal is to grow 
bigger and faster, more “efficiently” than the competition, in order to avoid being 
driven out of business. The fallacious notion that capitalism is based on competition 
conceals the fact that it is actually based on eliminating competition.
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Further expansion relies on the banking system. Companies need to borrow in 
order to finance investment, making the flow of credit and debt essential to capital-
ism’s daily operations. As McNally explains:
often, the only way firms can finance the massive investments necessary to 
keep up with the competition is by borrowing money. For this reason, mod-
ern capitalism could not function without a highly developed credit system, 
involving banks, stock exchanges, and other financial institutions. This credit 
system makes it possible for capitalists to finance spending on a scale that 
would not be possible from their retained earnings alone. But in order to 
borrow, firms have to pledge a share of future profits in exchange for invest-
ment funds in the here and now. And the future profits pledged must both 
repay the original loan (the principle) plus a flow of regular interest pay-
ments. But because the only thing creditors receive in the here and now is 
a promise to pay—be it a stock, a bond, or some other kind of promissory 
note—that represents a claim to a share of future profits, they are accepting 
forms of fictitious capital…. (2011: 79)
According to David Harvey, fictitious capital is “a flow of money capital not backed 
by any commodity transaction” (2006: 265). As McNally puts it, fictitious capital 
refers to “paper promises [that] are fictitious precisely because the profits they 
pledge to share may never materialize. What holders of these ‘financial assets’ pos-
sess is in fact a debt, a legal IOU. But should the debtor go under, the loan itself 
may never be fully repaid, if at all” (2011: 79-80).
Investment in fictitious capital is risky because it lays claim, not to actual wealth 
produced in the here and now, but to the possibility of future profit. Risk increases 
when fictitious capital is commodified into bundled packages of debt, such as secu-
rities, and is then bought and sold on the market. This occurs not simply because 
of capitalist “greed” that motivates a search for higher profits; as Albo et al. (2010) 
explain, it happens because finance plays an integral role in “pooling social surplus, 
creating credit-money in advance of production, disciplining wayward firms by 
withholding credit and in determining what new branches of industry to chan-
nel new investments” (34). Financial capital therefore “represents and defends the 
interests of all capitalists in capitalism” and makes possible the further expansion 
of the entire system (Ibid). 
The price of fictitious commodities can become inflated at points of exaggerated 
speculation. Investors start to buy stocks of fictitious capital and commodities—
paper claims to future wealth—not because they represent the existing profits of the 
company, but because investors expect that prices will increase. Ultimately, specula-
tive investment is based purely on a bet that someone else will pay even more than 
the initial investor did for the fictitious stock. But all of this investment ultimately 
leads to an overaccumulation of fictitious capital and thus an overaccumulation of 
debt. Crises emerge when capital 
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as a whole… has accumulated to an extent that the surplus value (profits) 
being extracted from workers and the stream of revenues flowing to capi-
talists from sales is not high enough—whether due to a wage-squeeze, a 
decline in the productivity of the capital stock, or adequate effective demand 
in the economy—relative to the investments made to sustain an adequate 
level of profitability. Without profits, capital cannot continue to expand and 
a crisis unfolds. (Albo et al. 2010: 38)
Due to competition, compulsion towards expansion impacts labourers as debtors. 
As human labour power is replaced by machinery, or by exploitive methods of “lean 
production”— getting workers to work harder, longer, and for less—a problem 
arises on the side of demand. If workers, who are also consumers, are earning less, 
a problem arises in effective demand for the commodities being sold by capitalists, 
creating yet another barrier to capital. The solution is increasing the amount of 
credit provided to consumers: “In the U.S., the largest family purchases (a house, 
a car and maintenance, education expenses) are made on credit. But consump-
tion runs on debt even for everyday purchases, quite often paid for with a credit 
card” (Lazzarato 2012: 19–20). This “is the simplest way to transform its owner 
into a permanent debtor” (19–20). For both sides of capital and labour, the drive 
towards surplus value and a system based on production for profit ultimately ends 
up producing debt as its corollary.8 As credit levels increase, more power is passed 
over to the financial sector and the debt economy. The interests of finance serve 
the interests of capital in general, but as increasing levels of credit are advanced, 
greater levels of debt accrued, sublimated, and repackaged as fictitious capital that 
perpetuates the system.
The capitalist drive towards the production of surplus value engenders a compulsion 
to expand due to competition; the necessity of credit for expansion; the necessity 
of driving down the cost of production in order to grow; and the need for credit in 
order to deal with the barrier of effective demand, all of which show that the “mad 
dance” of capital mirrors the “mad dance of desire.”9 The pursuit of surplus value is 
like the subject’s pursuit of the lost object of desire—the transcendental beyond of 
desire. Like the pursuit of the lost object of desire, which ends up producing lack 
itself as an object, the pursuit of surplus value produces an overabundance of debt. 
Like the sublime object, debt is that feature which is both responsible for the lack 
in the system, and for its surplus. But what makes debt of further significance is 
that it makes the economy immediately subjective.
Subjectivizing Debt: From Cynicism to Anxiety
Debt has played a significant role in disciplining labour and integrating workers 
into the matrices of finance capital both at the material and ideological levels. As 
workers continue to look to credit to sustain their private lives, anger towards the 
banks ultimately gives way to cynicism and “acceptance of the necessity to ‘save 
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the system’ [that] workers [have] become dependent on” (Albo et al. 2010: 127). 
This credit cycle is the material basis for the kind of cynical reason that has come 
to dominate as the standard ideological, fantasmatic support of postmodern, late 
capitalism; what Mark Fisher (2009) refers to as “capitalist realism.” Cynicism is 
the form assumed by the subject of desire. Related to the psychoanalytic concept 
of fetishism disavowal, cynicism is best described using the formula, “I know very 
well, but nevertheless…” As Todd McGowan puts it, cynicism is, 
a mode of keeping alive the dream of successfully attaining the lost object 
while fetishistically denying one’s investment in this idea. Cynicism con-
stitutes the primary ethical and political danger today because it allows 
subjects to acknowledge the hopelessness of consumption while simultane-
ously consuming with as much hope as the most naïve consumer… The 
cynical subject recognizes the logic of the drive and clings nonetheless to 
the promise of desire. (McGowan 2011: 29) 
This kind of cynicism relates to Fredric Jameson’s well-known thesis that it seems 
easier for us to imagine “a thoroughgoing deterioration of the Earth and of nature 
than the breakdown of late capitalism” (1994: xii). What the ideology of the end 
times accomplishes for capitalism is precisely its de-historicization. It creates the 
fantasy of an eternal capitalist order where the only thing that follows capitalism 
is the apocalypse (Flisfeder 2013). But what happens when the fantasy of the end 
times dissolves, given that this fantasy is what protects the subject from a traumatic 
encounter with the Real, in the form of the negativity of debt? The spatialization 
and thus obliteration of time under the conditions of finance capital makes the 
dissolution of this fantasy increasingly possible.
Time figures into fantasy to the extent that the attainment of the lost object is 
constantly delayed. Debt is sublimated through a kind of “temporal displacement.” 
But the debt economy must neutralize time: since subjectivizing debt means dis-
ciplining debtors to honour their debt promises, capitalism tries to place a control 
over the future because “debt obligations allow one to foresee, calculate, measure, 
and establish equivalences between current and future behaviour” (Lazzarato 2012: 
46). The debt economy is turned toward the future because finance is nothing if not 
a promise of future wealth. According to Lazzarato, there is therefore an incom-
mensurability between the promise of future wealth and the actuality of present 
wealth (2012). Finance is another means of risk management in the interests of 
capitalist class power: “all financial innovations have but one sole purpose: pos-
sessing the future in advance by objectivizing it” (46). For the debtor, finance has 
little to do with objectivizing and holding onto the future; it has more to do with 
the obliteration of the future, affirming Jameson’s thesis. If the debtor must con-
stantly borrow from future income and wealth, then she is constantly working in 
the present to pay “back” what will never be because it has already been borrowed, 
not saved. This creates a condition of what Jameson has elsewhere referred to as a 
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“perpetual present” ( Jameson 1998: 137). The debtor is always trying to catch up 
with her debts, the result of which is increased levels of anxiety.10
Anxiety, according to Alenka Zupančič, is one of the two moments of experienc-
ing the sublime developed in Kant’s writings. First, there is a moment of anxiety, 
which the subject can only escape by transforming it into the feeling of the sublime 
(Zupančič 2000: 149–50). Anxiety is thus the reverse side of the sublime. When 
the subject encounters the traumatic proximity of the Thing, she introduces a new 
distance towards it through the mediation of fantasy. As Renata Salecl explains, 
fantasy and anxiety “present two different ways for the subject to deal with the lack 
that marks him or her as well as… the symbolic order. With the help of fantasy, 
the subject creates a story, which gives his or her life a perception of consistency 
and stability” (Salecl 2004: 46–47). Fantasy provides comfort, while anxiety incites 
discomfort. 
Debt incites anxiety signalled not by an encounter with a lack or gap, but with the 
lack of a lack, that is, with a sublime object that takes the place of a lack. Anxiety 
arises when “at the place of the lack one encounters a certain object, which perturbs 
the fantasy frame though which the subject assessed reality” (Salecl 2004: 24). 
Confronting and identifying with this feeling, rather than escaping back into the 
protective shield of fantasy, makes the politicization of debt possible.
A Politics of Drive/A Politics of Debt—Se faire choisir
In The Ticklish Subject (1999), Žižek argues that desire and drive presuppose one 
another. They are “two ways of avoiding the deadlock of negativity that ‘is’ the sub-
ject…. [But, they] involve two thoroughly different notions of subjectivity” (298). 
The subject chooses her desire, but for the subject of drive, “the act of choice is 
inverted into se faire choisir, ‘making-oneself-chosen…. [T]he only… freedom I am 
granted in drive is the freedom to choose the inevitable” (299). An ethics of desire 
means yielding to one’s enjoyment/jouissance. The subject can move from one object 
to the next—a constant, metonymical search—without ever succeeding in moving 
beyond desire. In contrast, an ethics of drive means not giving way to one’s desire by 
committing oneself to the sinthome: the grounding, originary symptom that is tied 
to the subject’s fundamental fantasy and marks the initial instance of subjectiviza-
tion. Rather than distancing herself from enjoyment, the subject of drive identifies 
with it fully (Žižek 1993: 60). Identification with the sinthome signals the conclu-
sion of analysis, after the subject has “traversed the fantasy” that sets her position 
in relation to the symbolic order.
Given the structural position of debt in finance capital, a politics of debt is already 
a politics of drive. Debt is the object that chooses and politicizes the subject in 
finance-led capital. As Silvia Federici (2013) notes, “Being indebted to a bank hides 
the fact that there is a relation of exploitation. As a debtor you don’t appear any 
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longer as a worker. Debt is very mystifying. It brings about a change in the man-
agement of class relations.” A politics of debt therefore means “[t]he resumption 
of class struggle in the right place” (Lazzarato 2012: 164). Debt in its object-form 
overlaps with the subject as the gap or lack in the system. It signals processes of 
subjection, but for this very reason it also signals the politics of emancipation. 
Conclusion
A politics of debt can mean calling for defaults on loans, as in the case of the sov-
ereign debt crises in Europe. It can also mean building campaigns for forgiving and 
annulling debt, as in the case of Occupy Wall Street, the Strike Debt project, and 
decades of protest in the third world. It can also mean refusing austerity measures, 
such as in the 2012 Quebec student protests against rising tuition costs. I argue that 
in addition to these tactics, we must rethink the role of the state and the necessity of 
occupying state mechanisms for countering the neo-Malthusianism of the capitalist 
class.11 Instead of reliance on the liberal democratic state, this would be a politics 
that makes use of state mechanisms to democratize the allocation of resources and 
desublimate debt in the logic of capital. Recent scholarship on the de-privatization 
of the commons—natural resources, information, intellectual property, etc.—moves 
in this direction.12 So do processes that rebuild the political order from the bottom 
up, moving beyond mere inclusion to prioritization of the interests of the excluded, 
such as in developing forms of Latin American Socialism (see Harnecker 2010).
Other approaches may include democratizing finance, as Albo et al. (2010) propose: 
this would mean “bringing the banks into the public sector,” which they argue “is 
pivotal to any broader strategy of economic democracy” (110). It is not enough to 
raise the question of regulation since finance is not a separate sphere from capital; 
it is its central, organizational, artery. This is why democratization is required above 
regulation. What is needed:
is to turn the whole banking system into a public utility so that the dis-
tribution of credit and capital would be undertaken in conformity with 
democratically established priorities, rather than short-term profit. Similar 
considerations arise regarding the kinds of public provisions required to 
meet the new definitions of basic human needs, including those that come 
to terms with today’s ecological challenges. It is hard to see how anyone 
can be serious about converting our economy to a sustainable one without 
understanding that we need a democratic means of planning through new 
sets of public institutions that would enable us to take collective decisions 
about allocating resources for what we produce and how and where we 
produce the things we need to sustain our lives and our relationships to our 
environment. (Albo et al. 2010: 110)
Democratizing finance in this way might lead towards a new vision of how human 
needs are funded, and presents a debt towards needs rather than profits. Sticking 
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to a politics of debt in this way is the first step in desublimating capital, as opposed 
to the inequitable social relations of production that capital obscures. 
The Left must proceed with caution since the ruling class has its own politics of 
debt, which advocates through mainstream media for a self-serving increase in 
austerity, giving further evidence that debt is a central material and ideological 
feature of class struggle. Debt is Real in the Lacanian sense because it represents 
both the limit to the existing system and the principle of its ideological distortion. 
Cuts to social spending are legitimized through reference to rising levels of national 
debt, which conceals the fact that diminishing state revenues are the result of tax 
cuts to the wealthy, privatization of the commons, and the socialization of risk, 
debt and loss. Public debt is transformed into the private debt of the exploited 
classes, brought on by the structural contradictions of the system and its need to 
expand. Whichever shape the desublimation of capital takes, it will require a sus-
tained democratic and anti-capitalist movement alternative to the existing liberal 
democratic model.
Notes
1. I would like to give very special thanks to Max Haiven and the blind peer reviewers for 
their helpful comments and suggestions, all of which I take quite seriously. There is far too 
much to discuss on this topic in these few pages (and I take full responsibility for the gaps 
and omissions). What I present here is only the beginning of a conversation that needs to 
be continued.
2. This article gathers inspiration from two central sources. The first is Alain Badiou’s 
question: “What kind of politics is really heterogeneous to what capital demands?” 
(2001: 106). The second is the debate between Slavoj Žižek and Simon Critchley (see 
Žižek 2007 and Critchley 2008). In his book, Infinitely Demanding (2007), Critchley 
proposes an ethics of “interstitial distancing” from state power, as a tactic for the radical 
Left, whereby activists can continue to bombard those in power with an infinite list of 
demands that cannot necessarily be met. In response, Žižek argues that the thing to do is 
“to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected precise, finite demands which 
cannot allow for the same excuse” (Žižek 2008: 350). It is possible to reformulate Žižek’s 
position somewhat, to move from a finite demand to a finite object. My suggestion is that 
debt is an object that meets the criteria of Žižek’s proposal.
3. Neither is it a new object of struggle for activists. Silvia Federici (2013) notes that the 
first big debtors’ movements began in Latin America in the 1980s. Maurizio Lazzarato 
(2012) also notes how Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus provides an 
historical examination of debt as a way of analyzing contemporary capitalism, just before 
the full arrival of neoliberalism. For an intriguing critique of Graeber’s book see Beggs 
2012.
4. For an excellent analysis of the Quebec student uprising see Louis-Paul Willis 2014.
5. Stephanie Black’s film, Life and Debt (2001), demonstrates with brilliance the way that 
debt continues to be used as a mechanism for enforcing the economic imperialism of the 
global North over the global South in the post-colonial context. Silvia Federici (2013) 
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notes microfinancing loans tend to leave borrowers, mainly women, worse off than before 
they took the loan.
6. The indebted, exploited subject, brings to the surface the underlying structure of 
subjectivity more generally, just as debt as the lack in the system indicates something 
about its “normal” operation. 
7. Kordela (2007) argues similarly that the subject is tied to capital by human schuld: 
moral/legal guilt and economic debt. 
8. There is a conspicuous gender dynamic at play in the “financially fetishistic imaginary” 
(Ball 2007: 33), since the financial industry continues to be dominated by men, while the 
burden of debt is increasingly unloaded onto women and people of colour (Strike Debt: 
23, 96; see also Covert 2011 and Warren 2009).
9. Referring to the poststructuralist category of différance, Karyn Ball makes a similar 
argument regarding the circulation of fictitious values. Her term, “textual materiality,” 
refers to “the agency of signifiers in supplementing fictitious values” (2007: 7). The 
relationship between the agency of signifiers and my argument regarding debt as the 
sublimated object of capital, may be thought in terms of the Lacanian distinction between 
the master-signifier and the objet petit a. These exist in what Žižek (2006) calls a parallax 
relationship. Both, in other words, constitute the front and back of the same object, but 
each is viewed differently depending upon the subject’s position of enunciation. The 
fictitious values that Ball describes follow the logic of the signifier, while debt follows 
the logic of the objet petit a. Fictitious capital and debt, in other words, are two ways of 
relating to the same object, depending upon one’s subject-position within the system. 
This is not unlike the way that capital and labour relate differently to the logic of the 
commodity; or, even the different ways of relating to credit and debt. 
10. See note 7. It is worth considering the slide between anxiety and guilt when it comes 
to the politics of debt. Anxiety emerges in confronting the object minus the screen of 
fantasy, which is the result of a weakening of the superego. The superego, however, is the 
agent of invoking guilt feelings in the subject. As Žižek puts it, superego is “the price 
we pay for the guilt we contract by betraying our desire in the name of the good” (1994: 
69). A politics of debt requires traversing the fantasy—as in the process of the Lacanian 
cure—in order to confront anxiety directly, and shift from an ethics of desire to an ethics 
of drive.
11. See note 2. This is a point for returning to the terms of the debate between Žižek and 
Critchley: between an ethics of “interstitial distancing” and one of directly occupying state 
mechanisms.
12. See, for example, Federici 2012b; Hardt and Negri 2009; Douzinas and Žižek 2010.
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